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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant Robert Tequan Nappi ("Nappi") challenges his 
federal sentence of 105 months' imprisonment, claiming 
that it was improperly predicated on factual information 
contained in a state presentence report ("state PSI") that 
was not presented to him or his attorney prior to, or 
during, the sentencing hearing, and on which he had no 
opportunity to comment prior to the District Court's 
imposing sentence. He argues that Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32(c)(1) required the District Court to provide 
him with the state PSI prior to the sentencing hearing so as 
to afford him a meaningful opportunity to comment on the 
information contained therein befor e the Court imposed its 
sentence. 
 
It is undisputed that Nappi did not object to the Court's 
reliance upon the state PSI either during the sentencing 
hearing itself or in his post-sentencing submission. We, 
therefore, apply a "plain error" standard of review to the 
District Court's violation of Rule 32(c)(1). While we agree 
with Nappi that the Court violated Rule 32(c)(1), for the 
reasons that follow, we find that he has not met his burden 
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of establishing that the error affected"substantial 
rights,"--i.e., that there was any prejudice resulting from 
the Court's error. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court's sentencing order. 
 
II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
As Nappi's appeal focuses exclusively on the pr opriety of 
his sentence, we need only briefly discuss the facts. Nappi 
pled guilty to one count of possession of a fir earm by a 
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1). The 
federal PSI prepared by the Probation Office outlined 
Nappi's criminal history, but provided limited information 
with respect to his juvenile recor d. The section entitled 
"Juvenile Adjudications" listed five juvenile adjudications, 
and provided for each of them: (1) the date of Nappi's 
arrest; (2) the specific charges filed against him; (3) the date 
of sentencing and the disposition; and (4) Nappi's age at the 
time of the crimes. It stated, however, that"[t]he details for 
these juvenile cases are not available." Fed. PSI at 6-7. 
Under the heading "Other Juvenile Matters," the federal PSI 
further noted: 
 
       In addition to the above-captioned juvenile convictions, 
       between June 1986 and June 1994, Essex County 
       authorities apprehended the defendant on 15 occasions 
       for burglary, lewdness, assault, violation of probation, 
       robbery, criminal mischief, receiving stolen property 
       and resisting arrest. The charges for these arrests were 
       dismissed in the Essex County Juvenile Court of 
       Newark, New Jersey. 
 
Id. at 7. 
 
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the Court asked 
counsel if he had reviewed the federal PSI and if there was 
anything further that needed to be addressed. Defense 
counsel acknowledged that he read it and stated that he 
had no objections to its contents. Defense counsel then 
argued that Nappi should be sentenced to 84 months' 
imprisonment, which was the minimum sentence within 
the applicable Guideline range of 84-105 months. After the 
Court afforded Nappi his right of allocution, it proceeded to 
impose its sentence. Because of its significance, we recount 
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the relevant portions of the Court's sentencing 
pronouncement: 
 
       [T]he calculation [of the criminal history points] 
       demonstrates that Mr. Nappi has a number of criminal 
       history points which put him into criminal history 
       category 5 and expose him to a sentence of 84 to 105 
       months. It is my job as the Judge now to decide wher e 
       in that range Mr. Nappi should be sentenced. . . . 84 
       to 105 months, as we all know, is a 21 month 
       difference which is a sizeable range. And as I 
       demonstrated before, the exposure is considerably 
       higher than would otherwise be the case on an of fense 
       level of 23 because of his criminal history. So I look to 
       the nature of the criminal offenses and as I previously 
       observed, Mr. Nappi has been in the criminal justice 
       system since his first arrest at age 10. 
 
       I asked probation to share with me some of the earlier 
       Presentence Reports that were written regarding Mr. 
       Nappi. . . . [In connection with a 1995 arr est] a [state] 
       presentence report was prepar ed that set forth Mr. 
       Nappi's juvenile history, which as indicated began in 
       1986 with an arrest for burglary and criminal mischief 
       that was 6/21/86, within days of his 10th birthday. 
       Thereafter, there were arr ests for unlawful taking and 
       means of conveyance back sometime between `86 and 
       `89, and the next guilty [juvenile adjudication] was in 
       March of `90, after an arrest in October of `89 for theft, 
       criminal mischief and possession of burglary tools. . . . 
       Six months after that based on an arrest, the month 
       before that [juvenile adjudication] for r obbery, Mr. 
       Nappi was sentenced to one year probation. Again, we 
       are still looking at his juvenile history. 
 
App. at 29. Continuing, the Court then consider ed every 
contact Nappi had with the criminal justice system between 
1991 and 1994, including his history of dismissed juvenile 
offenses, and concluded: 
 
       I go through in somewhat painful detail the juvenile 
       history to demonstrate another painful fact, that is, Mr. 
       Nappi has consistently been involved in the criminal 
       justice system as either an arrestee or a--a juvenile 
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       delinquent or a convicted felon since the age of ten 
       with hardly any interruptions except for those periods 
       of time when he has been incarcerated. 
 
Id. at 30. The Court then considered his adult criminal 
history, and commented that Nappi had "been arr ested as 
an adult offender and ultimately convicted for criminal 
offense[s] every year since he tur ned 13, except for the 
period between February 1995 and February 1998 when he 
was incarcerated." Id. The Court r emarked: "What I have is 
a history of violent acts and patent recidivism and it was 
that, that I must look at in terms of sentencing Mr. Nappi, 
in the principal way given [by] the discr etion afforded to the 
Court by the Sentencing Guidelines." Id. at 31. After voicing 
its "concern that whatever this system of fers by way of 
leniency or a second chance Mr. Nappi has pushed aside" 
and noting that it "must consider that as well in terms of 
the discretion afforded under the Guidelines," the Court 
imposed its sentence of 105 months' imprisonment, the 
maximum sentence within the Guideline range. Id.  at 32. 
Throughout the Court's lengthy pronouncement, defense 
counsel did not object to the Court's reliance upon the state 
PSI. 
 
After imposing sentence, the Court asked if ther e was 
"anything further" to add to the matter of sentencing. 
Again, defense counsel lodged no objection to the Court's 
reliance upon the state PSI. Subsequently, Nappi filed a 
post-sentencing memorandum, asking the Court to 
resentence him so that his federal sentence would run 
concurrently with an undischarged state term of 
imprisonment pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(c). However, 
defense counsel did not seek resentencing based on the 
grounds he now asserts on appeal--namely, that the 
District Court improperly relied on the undisclosed state 
PSI in violation of Rule 32(c)(1). 
 
By Order of January 4, 2000, the District Court amended 
the judgment of conviction to reflect that Nappi's sentence 
of 105 months "shall run partially concurr ently" to the 
unexpired state sentence. Nappi filed a timely notice of 
appeal. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to both 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(1). Because Nappi 
did not lodge an objection at the sentencing hearing, we 
review the District Court's failure to comply with Rule 
32(c)(1) for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); United States v. 
Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir . 2000), cert. denied, 121 
S.Ct. 1157 (2001); see also United States v. Mangone, 105 
F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1997) (stating that court of appeals 
applies plain error standard of review to contention that 
district court violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) by failing to 
give adequate notice and opportunity to comment on 
court's upward departure where no objection was made in 
District Court). As the Supreme Court explained in Olano, 
under the plain error standard of Rule 52(b), we may vacate 
a sentence and remand for resentencing only if we find that 
(1) an error was committed; (2) the err or was plain, that is, 
it is "clear" and "obvious;" and (3) the error "affected [the 
defendant's] substantial rights." Olano , 507 U.S. at 734; 
Stevens, 223 F.3d at 242. This requires an assessment of 
the gravity of the error in the context of the proceedings. 
See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 (1997); see 
also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985) (stating 
that in evaluating whether the prosecutor's improper 
comments constituted plain error that seriously affected the 
fairness of the proceedings, the Court must view the 
statements or conduct "in context"). 
 
In most cases, to affect a defendant's "substantial rights," 
the error must have been "prejudicial," i.e., it "must have 
affected the outcome of the district court pr oceedings." 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Under plain error r eview, the 
defendant rather than the government bears the burden of 
persuasion with respect to prejudice. Id. Finally, even 
where plain error exists, "the Court of Appeals has 
authority to order correction, but is not required to do so." 
Id. at 735. We will correct a plain error only if it " `seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.' " Stevens, 223 F.3d at 242-43 n.4 
(quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732); see also United States v. 
Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1229 (3d Cir . 1994) (same). 
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On appeal, Nappi argues that the District Court 
committed plain error requiring us to vacate his sentence 
and remand for resentencing.1  He further claims that the 
error affected his "substantial rights" because the Court 
sentenced him to the maximum sentence within the 
Guideline range. Finally, he urges that this case is one in 
which we should exercise our discretion to correct the error 
despite his failure to object in the District Court because 
the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings." See Olano, 507 U.S. at 
736. The government responds that the err or was not plain 
and that Nappi's substantial rights were not af fected 
because he has not shown how he was prejudiced by his 
lack of opportunity to comment on the state PSI. 
 
A. 
 
Nappi contends that the District Court erred by relying 
upon the state PSI without providing a copy to counsel 
prior to the sentencing proceeding, and without giving 
counsel any opportunity to comment on it prior to imposing 
sentence. Specifically, Nappi claims that the Court violated 
Rule 32(c)(1) because it entitles counsel for the defendant 
and the government, at the sentencing hearing, to an 
"opportunity to comment on . . . matters r elating to the 
appropriate sentence."2 Nappi maintains that the state PSI 
qualifies as a "matter relating" to his sentence where, as 
here, it is clear that the Court relied upon the document in 
sentencing him at the top of the applicable Guideline range. 
He argues that in order to ensure that the "opportunity to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. While Nappi's brief argues that we should review the Court's 
noncompliance with Rule 32 for an abuse of discr etion, Nappi's counsel 
conceded at oral argument that our proper standard of review is for plain 
error due to counsel's failure to object in the District Court. 
 
2. The text of Rule 32(c)(1) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (1) Sentencing Hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the court must 
       afford counsel for the defendant and for the Government an 
       opportunity to comment on the probation officer's determinations 
and 
       on other matters relating to the appr opriate sentence, and must 
rule 
       on any unresolved objections to the presentence report. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
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comment" requirement in Rule 32(c)(1) has any meaning, 
the District Court should have provided counsel with a 
copy of the state PSI prior to the sentencing hearing in 
order to afford Nappi a sufficient opportunity to review it 
and prepare an appropriate response.3 
 
We agree with Nappi's interpretation of Rule 32(c)(1) in 
the circumstances presented here. Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 32, which governs sentencing procedures in the 
federal courts, emanates from Congress' concern for 
protecting a defendant's due process rights in the 
sentencing process. United States v. Curran , 926 F.2d 59, 
61 (1st Cir. 1991); see, e.g., United States v. Greer, 223 
F.3d 41, 58 (2d Cir. 2000). Indeed, it is well settled that a 
defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based 
upon accurate information. E.g., T ownsend v. Burke, 334 
U.S. 736, 741 (1948); Moore v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 
183 (3d Cir. 1978). Thus, to safeguar d this right, Rule 32 
contains specific requirements that ensure that the 
defendant is made aware of the evidence to be considered 
and potentially used against him at sentencing, and is 
provided an opportunity to comment on its accuracy. See 
Moore, 571 F.2d at 182; see also United States v. Blackwell, 
49 F.3d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1995) ("It is well established 
that a convicted defendant has the right to be sentenced on 
the basis of accurate and reliable infor mation, and that 
implicit in this right is the opportunity to r ebut the 
government's evidence and the information in the 
presentence report."); United States v. Jackson, 32 F.3d 
1101, 1105 (7th Cir. 1994) (Coffey, J., concurring) ("We 
begin with the well-established premise that a defendant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Initially, Nappi relied upon Rule 32(c)(3)(A) to argue that the 
District 
Court should have provided him and his counsel with a copy of the state 
PSI prior to the hearing, and given them an opportunity to comment on 
it. However, at oral argument his counsel focused upon the "opportunity 
to comment" language in Rule 32(c)(1). In any event, we point out that, 
as a technical matter, Rule 32(c)(3)(A) only requires the District Court 
to 
allow the defendant and his counsel a reasonable opportunity to 
comment on any information excluded fr om the federal PSI under Rule 
32(b)(5). And it is clear that the state PSI does not fall within the 
category of information that was excluded fr om the federal PSI pursuant 
to Rule 32(b)(5). 
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has a right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate 
information, . . . which implicates the cor ollary `right to 
know what evidence will be used against him at the 
sentencing hearing.' ") (quoting United States v. Morales, 
994 F.2d 386, 389 (7th Cir. 1993)) (internal citation 
omitted); United States v. Cervantes, 878 F .2d 50, 56 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (noting that requirements of mandatory 
disclosure of PSI and opportunity to respond were 
introduced to "ensure accuracy of sentencing information"). 
 
Among other procedural safeguards in Rule 32 that were 
designed to ensure that the defendant is sentenced based 
on accurate information,4 Greer, 223 F.3d at 58;United 
States v. Gomez, 831 F.2d 453, 457 (3d Cir. 1987), Rule 
32(c)(1) plainly states that counsel for the defendant and 
the government must be provided with an"opportunity to 
comment" at the sentencing hearing on the infor mation and 
conclusions in the PSI and "other matters r elating to the 
appropriate sentence." Fed. R. Crim. P . 32(c)(1). The 
Supreme Court has explained that the "opportunity to 
comment" language found in Rule 32(c)(1) pr ovides for 
"focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal 
issues relevant to determining the appr opriate Guidelines 
sentence." Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991) 
(holding that district court must provide "r easonable notice" 
of intent to upwardly depart from Guideline range). 
 
In the instant case, the District Court relied not only on 
the federal PSI the Probation Office pr epared, but also on 
Nappi's state PSI that the Probation Office had in its 
possession. Nappi's state PSI clearly constitutes a"matter 
relating to the appropriate sentence." Id. Thus, under plain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Those additional requirements set forth in Rule 32 relating to the 
information to be used at sentencing include the following: (1) Rule 
32(b)(1) states that a presentence report must be prepared in most 
cases; (2) Rule 32(b)(4) and (5) set forth the specific information to be 
included in and excluded from the PSI; (3) Rule 32(b)(6) provides for full 
disclosure to the defendant and counsel of the federal PSI within a set 
time period; (4) Rule 32(b)(6) allows the defendant to make specific 
objections to the factual information and conclusions in the PSI; and (5) 
Rule 32(c)(1) requires the court to make afinding on "each matter 
controverted" in the PSI or expressly state that no finding is necessary 
because the matter will not be taken into account at sentencing. 
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language of Rule 32(c)(1), Nappi was entitled to an 
opportunity to comment on the information in the report 
during the sentencing hearing. Moreover , given that the 
Rule is intended to promote "focused, adversarial 
development of the factual and legal issues," it follows that 
the Rule requires that counsel for the defendant and the 
government be provided with a meaningful opportunity to 
address the information at issue. Thus, we hold that where, 
as here, counsel are faced with having to review and 
address the contents of an additional document on which 
the Court intends to rely at sentencing, a meaningful 
opportunity to comment requires the Court, in accordance 
with Rule 32(c)(1), to provide a copy of the document to 
counsel for the defendant and the government within a 
sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing to afford 
them with a meaningful opportunity to comment on it at 
sentencing and, depending on the document, pr epare a 
response or contest it. See United States v. Hayes, 171 F.3d 
389, 392 (6th Cir. 1999) ("Rule 32 r equires that except in 
limited circumstances, . . . the defendant must have the 
opportunity to review information that will be used for 
sentencing."); United States v. Burger , 964 F.2d 1065, 1072 
(10th Cir. 1992) (vacating sentence wher e victim's letter 
impacted restitution order and the court and Probation 
Office failed to provide copies to counsel, stating that "[w]e 
agree with [defendant] that the utilization of the letters 
without disclosure to him was violative of Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32"); United States v. Connor, 950 F .2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir. 
1991) (dicta) (commenting that district court "should 
endeavor to insulate themselves" from extraneous 
documents it receives prior to sentencing unless it "makes 
them known to the parties"); Curran, 926 F.2d at 63 
(exercising supervisory powers and adopting rule that 
sentencing courts considering extraneous documents 
should either "make clear that the document is not being 
used for its factual content, or should disclose to the 
defendant as much as was relied upon, in a timely manner, 
so as to afford the defendant a fair opportunity to examine 
and challenge it");5 see  also United States v. Berzon, 941 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In Curran, the district court r eferred to information contained in 
letters from the defendant's victims in imposing its sentence without 
disclosing the letters to the defendant or his counsel. The Court of 
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F.2d 8, 18 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that district court should 
have alerted the defendant, in advance of the sentencing 
hearing, that it expected to consider co-defendant's 
testimony at the sentencing hearing). 
 
By stating that Rule 32(c)(1) requires the District Court to 
disclose such additional documents "within a sufficient 
time prior to the sentencing hearing to affor d them with a 
meaningful opportunity to comment," we refrain from 
adopting a more rigid rule because the time r equired in 
order for counsel to have a meaningful opportunity may 
vary depending on the circumstances. For example, we do 
not foreclose the possibility that it would be sufficient 
prehearing disclosure under Rule 32(c)(1) if the Court 
shared the documents with defense counsel on the date of 
the scheduled sentencing hearing, if the cir cumstances 
warranted that procedure. Depending on the number and 
complexity of the documents at issue, such pr ehearing 
notice could suffice if the Court adjourned the sentencing 
for a reasonable period in order to pr ovide counsel with 
sufficient time to prepare a response. The District Court 
should be guided by the principal goal of pr oviding 
adequate notice and opportunity to respond to the factual 
information the Court intends to consider at sentencing. 
 
Requiring reasonable prehearing disclosur e of the 
documents that the Court intends to rely upon at 
sentencing comports with the manner in which Rule 32 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Appeals for the First Circuit found that Rule 32 technically did not apply 
because the letters referenced at the sentencing hearing were not made 
part of the federal PSI. Curran, 926 F .2d at 62. It thus exercised its 
supervisory powers to fashion its rule that district courts must disclose 
extraneous documents to defendants "in a timely manner" if they intend 
to rely upon them at sentencing. As is evident from the text, we agree 
with the legal rule adopted in Curran, but we premise our holding on the 
language of Rule 32(c)(1). E.g., Hayes , 171 F.3d at 393 (disagreeing with 
Curran court's conclusion that Rule 32 does not require disclosure of 
extraneous documents but agreeing with r esult and rule it adopted); see 
also Burns, 501 U.S. at 135-37 (interpr eting Rule 32 as requiring a 
district court to give a defendant prior war ning that it is considering 
an 
upward departure on a basis not mentioned in the federal PSI, despite 
the fact that the Rule's literal language contains no such requirement). 
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prescribes disclosure of the federal PSI to the defendant 
and counsel, which, in most circumstances, serves as the 
critical document providing the factual and legal 
information bearing upon the Court's sentencing 
determination. See Moor e, 571 F.2d at 182 (stating that an 
"abiding concern about the use by a trial judge of material 
derived from a [presentence report] is that it may contain 
false or unreliable information," but noting that "this 
danger is somewhat alleviated" by disclosur e requirement 
in Rule 32); see also Curran, 926 F.2d at 64 & n.4 (noting 
that "concern for ensuring the reliability of information 
used at sentencing seems to have informed the disclosure 
policy embodied in Rule 32"). The Advisory Committee's 
Note to Rule 32 explains that the Rule was amended in 
1983 to require the district court, on its own initiative, to 
afford the defendant and his counsel an opportunity to read 
and comment on the PSI within "a reasonable time before 
imposing sentence," because "if the report is not made 
available to the defendant and his counsel in a timely 
fashion, and if disclosure is only made on r equest, their 
opportunity to review the report may be inadequate." Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 32 advisory committee's note (1983 amends.).6 
Id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. A Prior to 1983, Rule 32(c)(3)(A), as enacted in 1975, had required the 
court to allow defense counsel or the defendant"to read" the PSI and 
comment on it, but disclosure was requir ed only "before imposing 
sentence," and only upon the defendant's specific request. The pre-1975 
version of Rule 32(c)(2) permitted, but did not require, the court to 
disclose the contents of the PSI to the defendant or his counsel and 
provide an opportunity to comment on it. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32 advisory 
committee's note (1974 amends.). 
 
After the 1983 amendment, Rule 32(c)(3)(A) was amended again in 
1989 to change the "reasonable time" language to require that the 
defendant and defense counsel be provided with"a copy of the PSI at 
least 10 days prior to sentencing," unless the defendant waives that 
minimum period. Id. advisory committee's note (1989 amends.). Finally, 
in 1994, Rule 32 was reorganized and amended, and Rule 32(b)(6) now 
provides that the probation officer must present the PSI to the 
defendant, the defendant's counsel, and the gover nment's counsel, no 
later than 35 days before the sentencing hearing, unless the defendant 
waives that minimum period. Moreover Rule 32(b)(6)(B),(C), and (D) now 
provide explicit deadlines and guidance on r esolving disputes about the 
contents of the PSI. Id. advisory committee's note (1994 amends.). 
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As a matter of logic, regardless of whether the relevant 
factual information is derived from the federal PSI or some 
other additional source, the defendant must be afforded the 
opportunity to review the evidence assembled against him 
for sentencing purposes and to prepare a meaningful 
response. And unless disclosure of the additional 
documents pursuant to Rule 32(c)(1) is made sufficiently in 
advance of the sentencing hearing to permit counsel to 
review the information and to allow infor med comment, the 
purpose of promoting accuracy and fairness in the 
sentencing process, which undergir ds Rule 32, will be 
defeated. E.g., Burger, 964 F .2d at 1073; Berzon, 941 F.2d 
at 18; see also 3 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Criminal S 524 (2d ed. 1982) (noting that 
disclosure of the PSI "is not an end in itself," but rather, it 
"provide[s] an opportunity for the defense to comment on 
statements . . . and to correct mistakes"); cf. Burns, 501 
U.S. at 135-36 ("In our view, it makes no sense to impute 
to Congress an intent that a defendant have the right to 
comment on the appropriateness of a sua sponte departure 
but not the right to be notified that the Court is 
contemplating such a ruling."). 
 
In the instant case, Nappi had no knowledge that the 
Court even had the state PSI in its possession, let alone 
would consider it, until the Court mentioned it while it was 
imposing its sentence.7 In the circumstances, the Court 
effectively blind-sided Nappi's counsel with the document, 
and completely foreclosed his ability to r espond 
meaningfully, or for that matter, at all. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. While the government surmises that Nappi "in all likelihood received 
a copy of the state PSI prior to being sentenced in New Jersey state 
court" because N.J. Crim. R. 3:21-2 states that the PSI "shall be 
furnished to the defendant and the prosecutor," Appellee's Br. at 14 n.5, 
the record in the instant case does not r eveal whether Nappi ever 
received a copy of the state PSI during the state proceedings. Moreover, 
at oral argument, Nappi's counsel stated he was not certain whether his 
client had received the report during the state sentencing proceeding. In 
any event, it is clear that Nappi and his attor ney did not receive a copy 
of the state PSI in the context of the federal sentencing hearing, which 
occurred several years after the report was initially prepared. 
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The government urges that Rule 32(c)(1) does not 
mandate that the District Court disclose all of the 
additional documents it receives in connection with a 
defendant's sentence, and, accordingly, we should not read 
into the Rule a requirement that the Court must disclose 
documents that it intends to rely upon at the sentencing 
hearing. The government's reading of the rule, however, 
cannot be squared with the text of Rule 32(c)(1). The 
government's position contravenes the plain language of 
Rule 32(c)(1) because it undermines the expr ess right to 
comment, through counsel, "upon matters r elating to the 
appropriate sentence." As we have indicated, the Rule 
protects the defendant's right to an opportunity--a 
meaningful opportunity--to comment on infor mation 
relating to the federal sentence about to be imposed. And 
absent advance disclosure of the documents the Court has 
received and intends to rely upon at sentencing, defense 
counsel would have no ability to comment in an ef fective 
manner. See Burns, 501 U.S. at 136 ("The right to comment 
. . . has little reality or worth unless one is informed that 
a decision is contemplated.") (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
Further, the government's position runs counter to the 
Rule's stated "purpose of promoting focused, adversarial 
resolution of the legal and factual issues r elevant to fixing 
Guidelines sentences," id. at 137, and congressional intent 
in promulgating the Rule in the first place. Obviously, 
imposing a prehearing disclosure r equirement works to 
counsels' benefit because it affords them more time to 
compose their thoughts and consider their possible 
responses than if the sentencing court wer e to inform 
counsel of the existence, and contents of, the document for 
the first time during the sentencing hearing. The additional 
time to prepare thus increases the likelihood that the 
responses provided will be thoughtful and well reasoned, 
which in turn furthers the adversarial pr ocess 
contemplated by Rule 32. 
 
Moreover, as we have explained, the disclosure 
requirements in Rule 32 were developed to ensure that the 
defendant is sentenced based upon accurate infor mation. 
Berzon, 941 F.2d at 18; see United States v. Reiss, 186 F.3d 
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149, 157 (2d Cir. 1999). If we accepted the government's 
position and adopted an interpretation of Rule 32(c)(1) that 
would permit the District Court to inexplicably withhold 
from the parties a document that it relies upon in imposing 
its sentence, we would be opening the door to a gr eater 
possibility that the defendant could be sentenced based 
upon inaccurate sentencing information, rather than 
eliminating that very real danger from the sentencing 
process. 
 
Finally, our view that Rule 32(c)(1) requir es reasonable 
prehearing disclosure of additional documents considered 
by the Court is consistent with the Supreme Court's 
analysis in Burns v. United States, where the Court, 
although addressing a slightly differ ent issue under Rule 
32, reached the same conclusion regar ding the importance 
of notice and opportunity to comment in the sentencing 
process. In Burns, the Court r eviewed a district court's sua 
sponte upward departure from the applicable Guideline 
range. 501 U.S. at 135-37. The district court had given the 
defendant no advance notice of its intent to depart, and no 
opportunity to comment on it prior to imposing sentence. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that Rule 32(a)(1) 
(currently Rule 32(c)(1)) obliged the district court to furnish 
advance notice of its intent to upwardly depart from the 
Guideline range. He based his position on the language in 
Rule 32(a)(1) which required the District Court to afford the 
parties with "an opportunity to comment upon . . . matters 
relating to the appropriate sentence." Id. The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the 
government's reading of Rule 32 and affirmed the sentence. 
Applying a textual analysis, the court of appeals held that 
the Rule contained no express language r equiring a district 
court to provide notice of the court's intent to upwardly 
depart from the Guideline range. Id. at 132. 
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court r ejected the 
court of appeals' interpretation of Rule 32(a)(1), grounding 
its analysis on the "textual and contextual evidence of 
legislative intent."8 First, it pointed out that the court of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In November 1991, the Sentencing Commission added Application 
Note 1 to U.S.S.G. S 6A1.2 to requir e reasonable notice of an intention 
to depart, reflecting the Supreme Court's decision in Burns. See U.S.S.G. 
app. C, amend. 425 (1998). 
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appeals' reading of Rule 32(a)(1) "r endered meaningless the 
parties' express right `to comment upon matters relating to 
the appropriate sentence.' " Id. at 136 (quoting Rule 
32(a)(1)). Second, it rejected the gover nment's argument, 
predicated on congressional silence in Rule 32(a)(1), as 
being inconsistent with Rule 32's "purpose of pr omoting 
focused, adversarial resolution of the legal and factual 
issues relevant to fixing Guidelines sentencing." Id. at 137. 
It concluded that 
 
       before a district court can depart upwar d on a ground 
       not identified as a ground for upward departure either 
       in the presentencing report or in a pr ehearing 
       submission by the government, Rule 32 r equires that 
       the district court give the parties reasonable notice that 
       it is contemplating such a ruling. This notice must 
       specifically identify the ground on which the district 
       court is contemplating an upward departur e. 
 
Id. at 138-39.9 
 
In the instant case, the government's ar gument is a 
textual one, substantially similar to the one the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected in Bur ns. It asks us to elevate form 
over substance and adopt a construction of Rule 32(c)(1), 
that, as in Burns, would be contrary to the language and 
purpose of the Rule. But the Court's holding and analysis 
in Burns confirms that we must reject the government's 
proposed reading of the phrase "opportunity to comment 
. . . on matters relating to the appropriate sentence" as not 
requiring disclosure of a document to counsel on which the 
Court intends to rely at sentencing. Indeed, the fact that 
the Rule does not expressly requir e disclosure is not 
dispositive when, as in Burns, "all other textual and 
contextual evidence of congressional intent" points to the 
opposite conclusion. Id. at 137. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Court did not indicate what "reasonable notice" meant in practice. 
It explicitly stated that "[b]ecause the question of the timing of the 
reasonable notice required by Rule 32 is not before us, we express no 
opinion on that issue. Rather, we leave it to the lower courts, which, of 
course, remain free to adopt appropriate procedures by local rule." 
Burns, 501 U.S. at 129 n.6. 
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We also are not persuaded by the gover nment's argument 
that the District Court cured its error in not sharing the 
document with counsel by actually affor ding counsel with 
an opportunity to comment when it asked if ther e was 
"anything further" to discuss after it sentenced Nappi to 
105 months' imprisonment. The concept of meaningful 
opportunity to comment would be turned on its head if we 
were to find that such a question, at the conclusion of the 
sentencing hearing, constituted an opportunity for 
comment on a document after the Court has pr onounced 
its sentence. At that point, the Court has alr eady imposed 
its sentence, and any objection to the contents of the 
document is a fruitless exercise as far as actually 
influencing the sentencing court is concer ned.10 Rather, the 
purpose behind Rule 32(c)(1) as it applies in this context is 
to allow the defendant an opportunity to rebut or explain 
the contents of a document in an attempt to persuade the 
court concerning its meaning and/or relevancy before it 
sentences the defendant. 
 
In sum, we are convinced that the District Court violated 
Rule 32(c)(1) because it failed to disclose the state PSI to 
counsel for the defendant and the government within a 
sufficient time prior to the sentencing hearing, and did not 
provide counsel with an opportunity to comment on the 
contents of the document prior to pronouncing its sentence. 
 
B. 
 
Our conclusion that the Court violated Rule 32(c)(1) does 
not end our inquiry. We must determine whether the error 
was plain, that is, "clear or obvious," and the defendant 
must show that the error "affect[s] substantial rights." We 
will not dwell on the obviousness of the Rule 32(c)(1) error 
under current law because we believe that Nappi's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Of course, a belated objection is not entir ely without purpose, as it 
would preserve the issue for review by the appellate court. By referring 
to a post-sentencing pronouncement objection as"fruitless," we mean 
only to highlight the fact that by that point in the proceeding, the Court 
has already made up its mind that the document is relevant, and has 
already formed an opinion as to how it af fects the sentencing 
determination. 
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substantial rights were not affected.11 In Olano, the Court 
explained that "in most cases, [`affect[s] substantial rights'] 
means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must 
have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. The Court also clarified that under 
plain error review "the defendant rather than the 
government bears the burden of persuasion with respect to 
prejudice." Id. 
 
Nappi urges that the appropriate course of action to cure 
the Rule 32(c)(1) violation that occurred is to vacate the 
District Court's sentence of 105 months' imprisonment, and 
remand the matter for resentencing. His primary contention 
is that we should be guided by our analysis in Unites States 
v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2000), a case in which we 
vacated a defendant's federal sentence and r emanded for 
resentencing based upon the District Court's failure to 
pronounce its sentence orally and in the defendant's 
presence, in violation of Fed. R. Crim. P . 43. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The error here was the failur e to give counsel the "opportunity to 
comment . . . on matters relating to the appr opriate sentence." Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(c)(1). We have concluded that the state PSI was such 
material, and that the District Court should have pr ovided counsel with 
a meaningful opportunity to comment by pr oviding the document in 
advance of the sentencing hearing. We concede that it could be argued 
that, in crafting the way in which we give meaning to the concept of 
"opportunity to comment on . . . matters r elating to the appropriate 
sentence," we have established a prehearing disclosure requirement that 
is not so "obviously" or "clearly" mandated by the specific language of 
Rule 32(c)(1), and that accordingly, the District Court's failure to 
disclose 
the document to counsel cannot constitute "plain error." On the other 
hand, because an error is clear if it is "clear under current law," Olano, 
507 U.S. at 734, it could be argued that case law we reference above has 
prescribed the type of disclosure we endorse, such that the error was 
clear under current law. See United States v. Clark, 237 F.3d 293, 298 
(3d Cir. 2001) (stating that defendant's pr oposed methodology for 
calculating Guidelines sentence was plausible but that he could not 
demonstrate that the court's use of a contrary methodology was "an 
error [which was] clear under curr ent law," especially in view of the 
existing case law from other courts of appeals that supported district 
court's methodology). However, as we have indicated, we need not, and 
will not, address that issue. 
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In the alternative, Nappi maintains that he has satisfied 
his burden of proving prejudice in view of the fact that the 
District Court sentenced him to the maximum sentence 
allowable in the Guideline range--105 months' 
imprisonment. His position appears to be that, in view of 
the Court's obvious reliance upon the state PSI, it is clear 
that the Court would have sentenced him to a lower 
sentence within the Guideline range if it had not considered 
the information. 
 
We begin with Nappi's argument that our analysis in 
Faulks compels the conclusion that vacatur and r emand is 
appropriate, as it need not detain us long. Hefirst points 
out that in Faulks, we vacated a sentence and remanded 
for resentencing because we could not "know with sufficient 
certainty that the error [in failing to impose the Court's 
sentence orally in the defendant's physical pr esence] was 
harmless." Id. at 213. Nappi then r elies upon our 
statements in Faulks that compliance with Rule 43 was not 
"a meaningless formality" but rather"a fundamental 
procedural guarantee" that "implicate[d] constitutional 
concerns," id. at 211-13, to contend that the procedural 
protection of being afforded an opportunity to comment on 
information affecting the sentence is equally as 
fundamental. From these premises, he ur ges us to vacate 
his sentence and remand for resentencing in view of the 
Court's disregard of Rule 32(c)(1), even if, strictly speaking, 
he cannot affirmatively demonstrate any pr ejudice from the 
error. 
 
We are not persuaded by Nappi's attempted analogy to 
Faulks for two reasons. Its primary analytical flaw is that it 
overlooks a critical distinction between Faulks  and this 
case: in Faulks, we indicated that wer e we to examine the 
harmlessness, it was the government , rather than the 
defendant, that had the burden of establishing the error's 
harmlessness under Rule 52(a), and we stated that it had 
not "even attempted to meet its burden of establishing the 
error's harmlessness." Id. at 212-13. Here by contrast, 
Nappi bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of 
prejudice under Rule 52(b) because he failed to object to 
the Rule 32(c)(1) violation during the course of the District 
Court proceedings. Thus, the fact that we vacated Faulks' 
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sentence and remanded for resentencing where there was 
no showing of harmlessness provides no support for the 
conclusion that the same result should obtain in the 
instant case, which is governed by the mor e stringent plain 
error standard of review mandated by Rule 52(b). 
 
Nappi's reliance on Faulks is further misplaced because 
it is bottomed on the incorrect premise that the Court's 
violation of Rule 32(c)(1) implicates fundamental 
constitutional concerns as did the Rule 43(a) error involved 
in Faulks. In Faulks, we noted that the "Rule 43 error in 
this case implicates constitutional concerns." Faulks, 201 
F.3d at 213. We found United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 
654, 656 (5th Cir. 1991), which focused on the "elementary" 
nature of the defendant's right to be pr esent at the time of 
sentencing, directly applicable. Subsequently in Stevens, we 
hinted that the Faulks court found that the violation of 
Rule 43 amounted to a structural constitutional defect in 
sentencing, although the Faulks opinion did not explicitly 
so state. Stevens, 223 F.3d at 245 (citing Faulks, 201 F.3d 
at 211). 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized a "very limited class 
of fundamental constitutional errors" that"infect the entire 
trial process" and are so serious that they "require 
automatic reversal . . . without regar d to their affect on the 
outcome." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7, 8 (1999) 
(such errors including complete denial of counsel, biased 
trial judge, racial discrimination in selection of a grand 
jury, denial of self-representation at trial, denial of a public 
trial, and defective reasonable-doubt jury instruction). In 
Stevens, we rejected the defendant's attempt to add to this 
"very limited class of cases" the district court's failure to 
verify that the defendant had read and discussed the 
federal PSI with his attorney in accor dance with Rule 
32(c)(3)(A). Stevens, 223 F.3d at 244. We concluded that the 
court failed to comply with Rule 32(c)(3)(A)'s verification 
requirement, but that the violation did not rise to the level 
of a constitutional error, let alone a structural defect 
requiring automatic vacatur of the sentence without regard 
to the error's affect on the outcome of the proceedings. Id. 
 
We view the Rule 32(c)(1) error her e as similar to the Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) violation at issue in Stevens. While the 
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procedures set forth in Rule 32 ar e intended to safeguard 
the defendant's due process rights at sentencing, e.g., 
Curran, 926 F.2d at 61, and if a defendant were sentenced 
based upon inaccurate information, his due pr ocess rights 
would be violated, e.g., Townsend , 334 U.S. at 741; Moore, 
571 F.2d at 183-84, it is clear that the err or that occurred 
here, without more, is not of constitutional dimension. E.g., 
United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 837 (3d Cir. 
2000); Curran, 926 F.2d at 61; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, 
advisory committee's note (1966 amends.) ("It is not a 
denial of due process of law for a court in sentencing to rely 
on a report of a presentence investigation without 
disclosing such report to the defendant or giving him an 
opportunity to rebut it."). 
 
Accordingly, Nappi bears the burden of demonstrating 
that he was prejudiced by the District Court's error. We 
agree with the government's position that Nappi has not 
made a sufficient showing of prejudice to warrant the 
conclusion that the Rule 32(c)(1) error "af fect[ed] [his] 
substantial rights." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. We reject 
Nappi's argument that we should vacate and r emand the 
matter for resentencing based upon the natur e of the right 
at stake and the magnitude of the District Court's error. To 
the contrary, Nappi must convince us that, had he known 
that the District Court was going to rely on the state PSI, 
he would have done something by way of argument or proof 
relating to the document that probably would have 
impacted upon the Court's sentence. As we have indicated, 
under the plain error standard, Nappi bears the burden of 
establishing that the error "affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. On this 
record, we conclude that Nappi has not done so, and that 
it would probably be difficult to prove in any event under 
the facts presented. 
 
First, it is significant that defense counsel has not 
provided any indication as to how, if given the proper notice 
and opportunity to comment, he could have challenged the 
information in the report in a manner that would have led 
the District Court to impose a lesser sentence within the 
Guideline range. Importantly, defense counsel has made no 
suggestion that the information in the r eport was 
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inaccurate or false, or that the Court mischaracterized any 
of the information it cited from the state PSI. E.g., Stevens, 
223 F.3d at 243 (finding no prejudice from violation of Rule 
32(c)(3)(A) where defendant failed to assert any inaccuracy 
in the PSI). In the circumstances, he has failed to show us 
anything that would even justify an inference, let alone 
prove, that the District Court's sentence was bound to be 
different if Nappi had been affor ded a copy of the state PSI 
in advance of the hearing and had been given an 
opportunity to comment on it.12  See United States v. Garcia, 
78 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir. 1996) (where district court 
evaluated witness's credibility by relying upon extra-record 
affidavit at sentencing without first infor ming defendant, 
court of appeals stated that district court violated Rule 
32(c)(1) but found no prejudice; court noted that 
"[d]efendant fails to allege any facts or law that suggest the 
court's opinion of [the witness] would have changed if 
defendant had been aware of the . . . affidavit prior to 
sentencing"); United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (concluding that defendant failed to demonstrate 
that he was prejudiced by the court's Rule 32(c)(3)(A) 
violation where he could not "point[] to any portion of the 
presentence report that he would have challenged had the 
district court made an express inquiry"); United States v. 
Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 1526 (10th Cir. 1993) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In evaluating whether Nappi has satisfied his burden of showing 
prejudice, it is important to keep in mind that the District Court could 
have relied upon the state PSI if it had complied with Rule 32(c)(1). All 
the Court was required to do was to disclose the state PSI to counsel 
prior to the sentencing hearing and affor d counsel an opportunity to 
comment on it before pronouncing its sentence. Thus, the relevant 
prejudice inquiry is whether, and how, defense counsel could have 
rebutted the contents of the report, and whether the Court's sentencing 
determination would have been differ ent if counsel had been given the 
opportunity to do so; it is not whether the Court would have imposed a 
lighter sentence within the Guideline range in the absence of its 
consideration of the state PSI. However, even if we were looking at the 
prejudice issue from that perspective, Nappi could not demonstrate 
prejudice in any event. As we explain in the text, the information in the 
state PSI was largely cumulative, and ther e was a sufficient basis for 
the 
Court's sentence based on the factual information already found in the 
federal PSI. 
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(affirming sentence where district court violated Rule 32 by 
failing to determine whether defendant had opportunity to 
review PSI and discuss it with his attor ney because 
defendant "suffered no prejudice;" court noted that 
defendant "points to no factual inaccuracies used in 
computing his sentence"); United States v. Stevens, 851 
F.2d 140, 145 (6th Cir. 1988) (affir ming sentence 
notwithstanding district court's failure to determine 
whether defendant had opportunity to review PSI and 
discuss it with counsel; court of appeals found that 
defendant did not establish prejudice because district court 
did not rely on inaccurate information in sentencing 
defendant).13 
 
Further, we doubt whether it would be possible to prove 
harm, in any event. As the government correctly points out, 
the vast majority of the information contained in the state 
PSI was also contained in the federal PSI, either in the 
"Juvenile Adjudications" section or elsewher e in the report. 
Even by Nappi's own admission, the discrepancies were few 
in number and the overlap was significant. Thus, rather 
than supplying totally new factual information concerning 
the extent of Nappi's juvenile criminal history, the state PSI 
supplemented, but only slightly, the information already 
found in the federal PSI. See Appellant's Br . at 13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. See also United States v. Moore , 958 F.2d 646, 651 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting argument that court violated Rule 32 in considering 
confidential information in sentencing defendant without providing an 
opportunity to comment; court noted that defendant did not object below 
and that "[e]ven in these proceedings, there is no claim made that the 
trial judge's information was inaccurate"); United States v. George, 911 
F.2d 1028, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that district court complied 
with former Rule 32(a)(1) where court asked counsel during sentencing 
hearing whether circumstances warranted upwar d departure and 
counsel responded; court rejected defendant's argument that notice 
provided was insufficient and stated that defendant "has not shown how 
he was prejudiced by this notice [given], how he could have been helped 
by additional notice or time"); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 
440, 447 (6th Cir. 1984) (affirming sentence where court heard evidence 
at sentencing hearing not contained in presentence report; court based 
decision in part on fact that defendant "does not suggest what rebuttal 
he could make [to the evidence] other than his blanket denial, which the 
court had already heard"). 
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(characterizing state PSI as "supplement[ing] Nappi's 
juvenile history as stated in the federal pr esentence 
report"). We also recognize that the state PSI made it easier 
for the Court to consider the totality of the juvenile history 
because it listed each of Nappi's contacts with the juvenile 
justice system in chronological order . But the fact still 
remains that the amount of overlap in the federal and state 
PSIs supports the conclusion that the information in the 
state PSI was largely cumulative, which weighs against a 
finding of prejudice. See United States v. Patrick, 988 F.2d 
641, 648 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Where the evidence upon which 
the sentencing court relies without previously notifying the 
defendant is of the same character, allows the same 
inferences, and, most importantly, is subject to the same 
arguments in rebuttal as evidence in the record of which 
the defendant is already aware, it seems logical to conclude 
that advance notice would not give the defendant any 
additional incentive or ability to challenge the evidence."); 
cf. Hayes, 171 F.3d at 394-95 (court found that violation of 
Rule 32(c)(1) affected substantial rights based in part on 
the fact that there was no indication that the information 
provided in victims' letters, on which the district court 
relied in sentencing the defendant, was similar to or 
cumulative of evidence already presented). 
 
Additionally, given the wealth of information already in 
the federal PSI, we have little difficulty infinding that there 
was a sufficient amount of information concerning Nappi's 
juvenile history in the federal PSI that could easily have led 
the Court to the same decision--i.e., that Nappi's numerous 
arrests and convictions warranted the harshest sentence 
available within the applicable Guideline range. This fact 
also supports the conclusion that there was no prejudice in 
the circumstances presented here. See Patrick, 988 F.2d at 
648 (finding harmless error in failing to apprise defendant 
of court's reliance on extra-recor d information where "the 
other evidence already before the sentencing judge and a 
part of the presentence report fully supported the judge's 
ultimate finding that [defendant's] r ole was that of a 
leader."). Accordingly. we conclude that Nappi has not 
shown that he was prejudiced by the Court's err or.14 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Given this conclusion, we need not consider the last part of the 
Olano framework--whether we should exer cise our discretion to correct 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We recognize, of course, that the "sentencing judge may 
attend to more than the PSI when making sentencing 
decisions," United States v. Pandiello, 184 F.3d 682, 686 
(7th Cir. 1999), and our holding today does not foreclose a 
sentencing court's reliance upon additional documents if it 
is helpful to do so. Nevertheless, when the District Court 
relies on documents other than the federal PSI at 
sentencing, we hold that Rule 32(c)(1) requir es the District 
Court to share any such documents with counsel for the 
defendant and the government within a sufficient time prior 
to the sentencing hearing to afford them a meaningful 
opportunity to respond. Rule 32(c)(1) also mandates that 
the Court provide counsel with a reasonable opportunity to 
comment on any such additional information prior to 
pronouncing its sentence. 
 
We hold that the District Court erred in sentencing Nappi 
based in part on information found in the state PSI. 
However, Nappi has not met his burden of establishing that 
his substantial rights were affected. W e therefore will 
AFFIRM the District Court's judgment. 
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the error because it "seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings." Stevens, 223 F.3d at 242 (quoting 
Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). 
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